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Abstract 
This paper analyses programmes of cash allowances for children and compares their 
effectiveness in combating child poverty in Russia and four EU countries representing  
alternative family policy models – Sweden, Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom. 
Using microsimulation models, this paper estimates the potential gains if the Russian system 
were re-designed along the policy parameters of these countries and vice versa. The results 
confirm that the poverty impact of the program design is smaller than that of the level of 
spending. Other conditions being equal, the best distributional outcomes for children are 
achieved by applying the mix of universal and means-tested child benefits, such as those 
employed by the UK and Belgium. At the same time, the Russian design of child allowances 
does not appear to be less effective in terms of its impact on child poverty when transferred to 
European countries in place of their current arrangements. 
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1. Introduction  
In the last two decades the level and evolution of child well-being and poverty have become 
an important concern for social policy all over the world (Bradbury and Jantii, 1999, 
Bradshaw and Finch, 2002, Chen and Corak, 2005, UNICEF, 2005, Bradshaw et al., 2007, 
UNICEF, 2007, Richardson et al., 2008, OECD, 2009, Bradshaw, 2010, UNICEF, 2013, 
Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995). In most OECD countries child poverty rates are higher than 
overall population poverty rates, though there are significant cross-country variations in the 
extent and intensity of poverty.  Especially children in lone parent and large families are the 
subject of policy concern due to their overrepresentation among the poor (Salanauskaite and 
Verbist, 2013, Misra et al., 2007, Van Lacker et al., 2012).  
Evidence suggests that economic indicators of well-being, in particular the distribution of 
income and poverty, are the key variables that affect the overall well-being of children. At the 
macro-level, income poverty and inequality indicators have been shown to be negatively 
correlated with other aspects of child well-being (UNICEF, 2007, Richardson et al., 2008, 
OECD, 2009, Pickett and Wilkinson, 2007). Micro-level studies have established a causal 
relationship between growing up in poverty and life chances of children, especially in terms 
of educational and cognitive outcomes, and that this causal relationship is likely to be 
stronger early in the lifecourse (Duncan et al., 1998, Phipps, 1999, Conti and Heckmann, 
2012). Hence, increasing the income of families of young disadvantaged children is likely to 
be a key part of any portfolio of policy solutions to improve child well-being outcomes. 
Public policies can be a decisive factor in guaranteeing the material well-being of children 
when the labour market has failed to provide them with the required means. Higher 
government spending on social programs for families with children is clearly associated with 
lower absolute and relative child poverty rates. At the same time, the variation in the way the 
national social protection programs are structured and delivered appears to account for most 
of the variation in child poverty in Europe (Bradshaw et al., 1993b, Bradshaw and Finch, 
2002, UNICEF, 2005, OECD, 2009, Bradshaw, 2010).    
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Most research on the poverty impact of state policies for children and families has 
concentrated on OECD countries and ‘old’ EU member states. Research on family policies 
and child well-being in Russia is still quite rare, with few examples (Denisova et al., 2000, 
IBRD/WB, 2002, Notten and Gassmann, 2008, Ovcharova and Popova, 2005, Ovcharova et 
al., 2007, Popova, 2013b, UNICEF, 2011). The country though is highly interesting not only 
because of the fast changing socio-economic environment and demographic conditions, but 
also because of the unique combination of the socialist legacies and recent developments in 
family policy.  
Compared to EU countries, Russia performs below average in all dimensions of child well-
being and poverty, especially in terms of its economic situation and its health outcomes 
(UNICEF 2011). Negative child welfare developments in Russia are consequences of the 
economic crisis of the 1990s, which resulted in large-scale low-paid employment and a 
reduction in statutory support to families (Denisova et al., 2000, IBRD/WB, 2002). In a 
relatively short period of time Russia has moved from a centrally managed universal welfare 
provision to a residual neo-liberal welfare model (Manning and Tikhonova, 2004, Titterton, 
2006, Cook, 2007, Cerami, 2009, Burawoy, 2001). The gap between children and the rest of 
the society continued to grow during 2000s, despite a twofold decline in the overall poverty 
headcount (Ovcharova and Popova, 2005, Notten and Gassmann, 2008). Children ended up 
being the poorest group in society (UNICEF 2011).   
The risk of further depopulation due to very low fertility rates and extremely high mortality 
rates of the working age men (UNDP, 2009) became the main motivation behind the major 
revision of government financial measures concerning families with children in 2007, 
including an increase in the sizes and numbers of recipients of maternity allowances, the 
introduction of a generous bonus for the second baby and a weakening of the targeting 
mechanisms. Although these reforms should be treated as a serious achievement after 15 
years of disregard of this area, they have improved the financial situation of a very small 
group of families with children (i.e. families with children under 1.5 years), while the 
majority are left without any significant public support (Ovcharova et al., 2007). The twofold 
reduction in the poverty headcount between 2000 and 2008 can be mainly attributed to the 
favourable macroeconomic background (UNICEF, 2011). The present Russian social 
protection system is characterized by poor funding, low level of social assistance, bad 
targeting performance and insufficient supply and quality of childcare institutions. The 
decentralization of social protection achieved through a series of major reforms in 2005 has 
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contributed to a further growth of the disparity in the well-being of children living in different 
regions of Russia.  
All in all, the previous studies have concluded that it is unlikely that a large-scale reduction 
of child poverty in Russia could be achieved without a major tax-benefit reform, including a 
significant increase in spending on family and child-targeted policies. However, little is 
known about the impact of tax-benefit policies on child poverty in Russia in the late 2000s. 
The Russian tax-benefit system consists of numerous types of support available to a large 
circle of beneficiaries; they are regulated by a number of legislative acts that focus on certain 
types of assistance, rather than on vulnerable groups. Moreover, after the decentralization 
reform carried out in 2005, regions can implement their own social programmes, that differ in 
terms of design and generosity. This study aims to fill this gap by using the first full-scale 
tax-benefit microsimulation model for Russia (RUSMOD
i
), which allows simulating most of 
the existing cash policies implemented at federal and regional level, for the nationally 
representative sample in 2010. Being the part of the tax-benefit model for the European 
Union (EUROMOD), the Russian model can be used for cross-country comparisons. This 
marks a striking difference with respect to all previous attempts to estimate the distributional 
impact of taxes and benefits in Russia.  
 The focus is on programmes of cash allowances for children and this study compares their 
effectiveness in combating child poverty in Russia and four EU countries – Sweden, 
Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom (UK). These countries are selected as 
representatives of alternative family policy models (Gauthier 1996, Gauthier 2000). Using the 
microsimulation models, this paper estimates the potential gains if the Russian system were 
re-designed along the policy parameters of these countries and vice versa. Such an exercise 
rests on the idea of policy learning and provides policy relevant evidence on how a policy 
would perform, given different national socio-economic and demographic settings.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on the impact 
of public policies on child poverty in cross-national perspective. Section 3 explains the 
methodology of policy swaps using the microsimulation models. Section 4 presents and 
analyses the results of microsimulation. Section 5 concludes and suggests some policy 
lessons. 
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2. Literature on the impact of public policies on child poverty 
All industrialized countries introduced comprehensive policy packages for families with 
children (Bradshaw, 2010, Corak et al., 2005 , Figari et al., 2011). Child poverty reduction is 
not the one and only objective of family policies; in fact there is evidence to suggest that 
concerns about declining fertility are the strongest motive for politicians to take real action in 
this area (Hantrais, 2004). Child poverty is, nevertheless, the most immediate outcome of 
family policies. The three factors that underlie changes in child poverty rates are 
demographic factors, labour markets and public sector effects. Demographic factors turn out 
to be less important than markets and the public sector (Adam et al., 2002, Chen and Corak, 
2005, UNICEF, 2005). High child poverty rates are a strong indication that welfare states are 
not investing enough in public support for families with children in order to compensate for 
the labour market failures in this respect.   
When one looks at the impact of different policy designs, rather than at the amount of 
spending, the picture is a good deal more complex. Compared to other areas of social policy, 
the designs of family policies demonstrate the highest level of diversity across and within 
welfare regimes. Various scholars disagree as to how to group particular states because of 
differences in the specific aspects of family policy emphasized in their frameworks (Bambra, 
2004, Hantrais, 2004, Hantrais, 1999a, Hantrais, 1999b, Lewis, 2001, Lewis, 2006, Pascall 
and Lewis, 2004, Korpi, 2000, Lewis, 1992, Lister, 1994, Orloff, 1993, Rostgaard and 
Friedberg, 1998, Sainsbury, 1999, Taylor-Gooby, 1996, Gauthier, 1996, Gauthier, 2000).  
The ongoing debate has focused on the questions of whether the funding and delivery of child 
benefits should be centralized or decentralized (Glennerster, 2009, Ferrera, 2005, McEwen 
and Moreno, 2005, Obinger et al., 2005, Pierson, 2001, Dubois and Fattore, 2009, Castles, 
1999); whether they should vary by number and age of children, and family type (Bradshaw, 
2006, Bradshaw, 2010, Bradshaw et al., 1993b, Bradshaw et al., 1993a, Bradshaw and Finch, 
2002, Bradshaw et al., 2007, OECD, 2009); whether they should be universal or 
means/wealth-tested (Oorschot van, 2002, Pritchett, 2005, Gelbach and Pritchett, 1995, 
Moene and Wallerstein, 2001, Skocpol, 1991, Korpi and Palme, 1998).  
This study employs the framework by Gauthier which identifies four distinct models of 
family policy that have emerged in Europe (Gauthier, 1996, Gauthier, 2000). Looking 
specifically at the family policy domain, Gauthier’s typology produces four distinct Western 
family policy regimes that have emerged historically, as an interaction of three main factors: 
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public policies, demographic trends and the intermediate role of non-governmental actors. 
The advantage of this framework over other options proposed in the literature is that it 
emphasizes the causal link between the objectives of family policies, the instruments applied 
and the actual policy outcomes, which makes it the most robust framework in the context of 
impact evaluation. Four European countries – Sweden, Germany, Belgium and the UK – 
were selected as the representatives of alternative family policy models. The design of the 
tax-benefit systems of these countries differs considerably, reflecting the different aims of 
family policy (Table 1). 
The pro-egalitarian family policy (Sweden) is aimed at promoting gender equality, so that 
both men and women are treated as earners and care providers. The main bulk of statutory 
funding is spent on universal public services, including institutional childcare. The system of 
social transfers is dominated by universal, not income-related, benefits, paid per child, and 
not varying with special circumstances. The pro-natalist family policy (Belgium) is 
concerned with the low fertility rate, hence, most policies are aimed at encouraging families 
to have more children. A large amount of funding is directed to childcare services in order to 
help mothers to reconcile employment and family life. Cash allowances are generous and 
most are not income-related, and are arranged so that benefit levels increase more than 
proportionally with each additional child, making the system more supportive of large 
families. The pro-traditional family policy (Germany) is mainly concerned with the 
preservation of the traditional ‘male-breadwinner’ family model. Cash benefits are generous, 
but public support for working parents is moderate; inadequate supply of childcare does not 
allow women to fully combine paid employment and family life. Finally, the non-
interventionist
ii
 policy (the UK) considers families to be all-sufficient, so public support is 
targeted at the needy. Correspondingly, the main flow of social protection is channeled 
towards families through means-tested cash benefits. Statutory childcare facilities are not 
developed, as it is believed that the market will meet any needs that emerge.  
As far as Russian is concerned, having inherited many features of the pro-egalitarian family 
policy model from the Soviet times, during the last 20 years Russia has been moving towards 
a non-interventionist regime. The period of the 1990s and early 2000s saw a devaluation of 
family related allowances and a reduction in the number of eligible families, due to the 
introduction of means-testing. The availability of preschool institutions – the main element of 
public support for working parents – has been rapidly deteriorating since the early 1990s. 
Currently the supply of such services, both in quantity and in quality, does not satisfy the 
7 
 
growing demand. Concerned with the upcoming demographic crisis, since the mid-2000s, the 
Russian government has emphasized, in its rhetoric, pro-natalist objectives, which are 
reflected in the strategy of the recently undertaken increases in the amounts and coverage of 
maternity allowances, the introduction of a generous bonus for the second baby and a 
weakening of the targeting mechanisms. However, even after these innovations, by European 
standards Russia spends little on family related policies (1.8% of GDP in 2010 compared to 
2.6% on average for the four EU countries) and even less on cash benefits for families with 
children (0.6% of GDP versus 1.7% for the four EU countries).    
 
Table 1 about here 
 
3. Methods and data 
The final child poverty outcomes are though highly country specific due to complexities of 
the overall national policy systems, socio-demographic environments and original income 
distributions. Microsimulation models are the only means to disentangle the poverty impact 
of these interlinked factors. This paper uses EUROMOD – the static tax-benefit model of the 
EU (Sutherland, 2001, Lietz and Mantovani, 2007, Sutherland et al., 2008, Figari and 
Sutherland, 2013) and RUSMOD – the static tax-benefit model for Russia which is fully 
compatible with EUROMOD (Popova, 2013a). Static microsimulation models, such as 
EUROMOD and RUSMOD, quantify the consequences at the micro-level of changes in tax-
benefit policies, given that the characteristics of the underlying population remain constant, 
and vice versa (Immervoll and O’Donoghue, 2009). In practical terms, they represent a 
computer code that calculates disposable income for each micro-unit (individual or 
household) in a representative sample of the population. The calculation is made up of 
components of income taken from the micro-data directly (e.g. employee earnings) combined 
with the components simulated by the model (tax liabilities and benefit entitlements). 
Microsimulation models allow for a detailed analysis of the revenue and distributional effects 
of an individual policy, or of the whole policy system, before and after a real or a 
hypothetical reform. In contrast to the traditional analysis of raw survey data, 
microsimulation models are up-to-date in respect of the latest changes in policies and take 
full account of interactions between all elements of the tax-benefit system, including the 
‘hidden’ part of the welfare state, i.e. indirect (tax) transfers. In contrast to the ‘typical cases’ 
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approach, which is, for instance, applied by OECD in their Taxing Wages series (OECD, 
2014), the output of microsimulation can be generalized to the population of the country.  
The first main limitation associated with using static microsimulation models, such as 
EUROMOD and RUSMOD, is that they can only predict the first-order consequences of 
policy changes, i.e. the ‘morning after’ changes in economic well-being and poverty of 
households with children (Bourguignon and Sparado, 2006). Evaluation of long-term effects 
of policy reforms (e.g. changes in labour market participation or in demographic behaviour) 
is beyond the scope of this study.  The second limitation is that EUROMOD and its spin-off 
RUSMOD in their current version do not simulate non-cash policies. Hence our simulation 
exercises are limited to the assessment of impact of cash transfers for families with children. 
At the same time, this kind of analysis is still highly relevant. Firstly, cash policies directly 
affect the material well-being of children – and shape outcomes such as poverty and 
inequality (Bradshaw, 2012). The child’s family income is a key dimension and is widely 
known to be strongly correlated to other aspects of well-being (UNICEF, 2007, Richardson et 
al., 2008, OECD, 2009). Secondly, cash transfers can be quantified and measured at the 
micro-level and hence can be used in cross-country analysis. Thirdly, they arguably 
demonstrate the highest level of diversity across European welfare states . Non-cash benefits 
as a percent of GDP are far more equal across nations than are cash benefits (Smeeding and 
Rainwater, 2002).  
Table 2 describes EUROMOD and RUSMOD input data. For Russia, they are derived from 
the national household survey RLMS-HSE. Sweden, Germany and Belgium use EU-SILC as 
a basic input dataset. The UK uses a national household survey – the Family Resources 
Survey 2008/2009. For all countries the policy systems of 2010 are simulated and used here
iii
.     
 
Table 2 about here 
 
EUROMOD has been previously used to evaluate the poverty effectiveness of state support 
to families in the EU countries (Corak et al., 2005 , Figari et al., 2011, Levy et al., 2013). 
Several studies attempted to estimate the cost-effectiveness of specific policy instruments by 
‘borrowing’ different elements of family policies from other EU countries and comparing 
their effects with those of the original systems (Levy, 2003, Levy et al., 2008, Salanauskaite 
and Verbist, 2013) This paper takes a similar approach in Russia.  Although an inquiry into 
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the cumulative impact of family policies is of high interest this study analyses only a part of 
the existing child benefit package due to data limitations
iv
 and difficulties in replicating some 
of the simulated allowances in other countries
v
. The focus is on cash allowances and tax 
credits that are: (1) formally targeted at families with children; (2) provided on a regular basis 
(i.e. each week or month); and (3) simulated in all five countries under study. Table 3 
summarizes each country’s approach regarding cash allowances and tax credits for children, 
in detail. For all countries the policy systems of 2010 are simulated and used here. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
All European countries under study have a unified national design for programmes of child 
allowances. It is only in Russia that this programme is decentralized; according to the federal 
regulations the allowance must be provided in all regions, but the amounts are set by regional 
authorities. Although RUSMOD simulates policy rules at the regional level, to ensure 
meaningful cross-country policy swaps this paper assumes that the average benefit amounts 
apply in all regions of Russia
vi
.      
Amounts of child benefits per child may vary depending on the number of children, the age 
of a child and the family type – reflecting different goals of family policy. For example, in 
Sweden and the UK the amounts get smaller with each additional child, assuming decreasing 
‘marginal costs of children’. In contrast, in Belgium the amounts paid per child increase with 
the rank of the child within the family, in Russia the amounts increase starting from the 3
d
 
child, in Germany – starting from the 4th child. The age-related supplements (implying higher 
costs of older children) are available in Sweden and Belgium. The supplements for lone-
parent families are available in Belgium, the UK and Russia.  
In relation to the discussion on universalism and targeting as modes of welfare allocation, 
Sweden and Russia represent, respectively, a purely universal and purely selective approach, 
as far as child allowances are concerned. The other cases use a mix of universal and means-
tested programmes. Germany leans towards a universalistic approach, with a small proportion 
of means-tested benefits. Belgium, with equally important universal and means-tested 
elements, is in the middle of the said continuum. The UK relies heavily on means-testing, 
providing a small flat-rate universal benefit for all children
vii
.   
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Three simulation scenarios are discussed in this paper. Firstly, in order to assess the 
effectiveness of the selected transfers to children, in terms of reducing child poverty given 
national circumstances, they were ‘removed’ from the tax-benefit systems (Reform 1). The 
rest of the national policies remain in place and may compensate for the removed 
programmes
viii
. By comparing poverty outcomes with and without selected transfers we can 
evaluate their redistributive impact. Secondly, child allowances were ‘swapped’ from 
Sweden, Germany, Belgium and the UK to Russia. The first swap is fully budget-neutral, i.e. 
monetary amounts are firstly converted from the national currency of the ‘donor’ country into 
the Russian national currency (ruble) using PPPs and then adjusted by scaling them down so 
that the aggregate expenditure on child benefits in Russia remains unchanged (Reform 2.1). 
In this way the borrowed policy is fully ‘adapted’ to national circumstances. In the second 
implementation, the budget for child allowances is increased up to the average budget of 
similar programmes in the four EU countries (Reform 2.2).      
The impact of swapped policies is evaluated by comparing a set of programme characteristics 
and measures of income distribution before and after implementation of a certain scenario. 
Income is expressed in monthly terms and equivalised using the old OECD equivalence scale, 
which is closer to the empirical equivalence scale derived for Russia than the modified 
OECD equivalence scale
ix
. This study uses the concept of poverty applied by Eurostat, 
whereby the poverty line is set at 60% of median equivalised disposable income. This 
poverty threshold based on the baseline simulation of the 2010 Russian tax-benefit system is 
221.4 euros per month per equivalised person. The poverty thresholds in the baseline 
simulation for European countries are as follows: 961.5 euros for Sweden, 828.2 euros for 
Germany, 791.9 euros for Belgium and 726.8 euros for the UK. Poverty thresholds are fixed 
at the baseline level in all the simulations. The tables presented below display the baseline 
policy indicators and relative changes in the indicators between the simulated scenarios and 
the baseline scenarios (in %), for the entire population, for children under 18 years, and for 
various types of households with children. Statistically significant (average) changes in 
indicators are highlighted in grey. A paired t-test was applied to assess the statistical 
significance of the difference of the means of the variables in the baseline and the simulated 
scenarios (Goedemé, Van den Bosch et al. 2013).  
In the baseline simulation (Table 4) poverty rates for children under 18 years ranged from 
15% in Sweden to 25.6% in the UK, with Belgium and Germany being somewhere in the 
middle (15.8% and 16.9%, respectively). The gap between poverty rates for children and for 
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the entire population ranged from 1.3 times in Germany, to 1.4 times in Sweden and 
Belgium, to 1.5 times in the UK. The highest income gap ratios for children are observed in 
the UK (26.8%) and Sweden (26.2%), and the lowest are in Belgium (18.5%) and Germany 
(15.2%). However, in terms of poverty depth children in European countries at least do not 
fall behind the rest of the poor population; in fact in Germany and Belgium income gap ratios 
for children are lower than for the entire population. In Russia the child poverty headcount 
amounts to 19.8% and the income gap ratio - to 28.3%. It is worthy to note, the poverty 
threshold used in Russia in absolute terms is at least 3 times as low as the ones in the selected 
EU countries. If the Russian poverty threshold was applied in EU countries, their poverty 
headcounts would be substantially reduced. Similar situation arises when poverty headcounts 
are compared across the enlarged EU using poverty thresholds at 60% of national median 
income, due to disparities in the absolute living standards between the Old and New member 
states (Whelan and Maıtre, 2010). At the same time, the analysis by Whelan and Maitre 
(2009) supports the view that as far as poverty is concerned the predominant frame of 
reference for the European population is a still national one. That is why in this study we 
opted for keeping national poverty thresholds in all the simulations. Since all the comparisons 
between the simulated and baseline scenarios are made in relative terms at the national level, 
relative poverty thresholds will not affect our conclusions regarding the impact of policies on 
distributional outcomes.    
Of particular interest are couples with 3+ children and lone-parent families because they are 
most susceptible to falling into poverty, due to their vulnerable position in the labour market 
(Table 4). In all European countries in our sample, the probability of being poor for lone 
parent households is at least 2 times as high as the average national figures (2.1 times in the 
UK, 2.5 times in Germany and 2.9 times in Sweden and Belgium). Poverty rates for families 
with 3+ children are also higher than average (1.4 times in Belgium, 1.7 times in Germany 
and Sweden and 2.3 times in the UK). In Russia lone parents appear to be less vulnerable 
than those in Europe, because typically they live in three-generation households. Yet their 
risk of poverty is 1.5 times as high as the national average. The most problematic group in 
Russia is families with 3+ children, whose poverty rate is 1.7 times higher than the national 
average. In other words, child poverty is not an exclusively Russia’s problem; the relative 
poverty profile is quite similar in all the countries under study, despite much higher absolute 
poverty rates in Russia.   
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4. The distributional impact of alternative child benefit schemes   
4.1 Baseline policies   
A reasonable level of spending and coverage levels of a policy are essential for achieving any 
significant distributional outcome. Estimates shown in Table 4 (Reform 1) demonstrate that 
in terms of overall spending on regular cash transfers for children, the leader is the UK, 
where they amount to 1.5% of GDP. Two continental countries – Germany and Belgium – 
spend similar shares of their GDP on child related cash allowances – 1.3 and 1.2%, 
respectively. Sweden’s expenditure on cash benefits for children is considerably lower (0.7% 
of GDP). Russia is a laggard in terms of expenditure (0.12% of GDP) due to extremely low 
benefit amounts. The vertical efficiency of child allowances (measured as the share of the 
overall budget going to the poor) is rather low in continental European countries, ranging 
from 23.3% in Sweden to approximately 30% in Germany and Belgium, and high in the UK 
(57.2%). Russia is lagging behind, with only 38.6% of the budget going to beneficiaries who 
are poor, despite the fact that the Russian programme is the only fully means-tested one.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
If it were not for cash transfers to children, all the European countries under study would 
have considerably higher inequality and poverty levels, for all the groups of interest. On 
average in the four European countries, the reduction in the Gini coefficient amounts to 6.2%, 
while the national poverty rate and the poverty depth figures are reduced by 19 and 12%, 
respectively. The average reduction in the poverty headcount for children under 18 years 
amounts to 44%, while the income gap is reduced by 25% on average. The schemes 
employed by EU countries are very effective in terms of reducing poverty in vulnerable 
groups. There is a 60% reduction in the poverty headcount and a 34% reduction in the 
income gap of families with 3+ children under 18 years. The poverty headcount of lone 
parent families is reduced by 38% on average, while their income gap ratio is reduced by 
27%.   
It appears that, within national circumstances (composition of the population and original 
pre-transfer distribution of income), the Belgian programme outperforms the rest (including 
the most expensive British programme) in terms of reducing the depth of poverty for children 
under 18 years, large families and lone parent families. The British scheme is however the 
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most effective one in reducing national poverty figures, and it is also among the most 
effective schemes in terms of reducing poverty for lone parent families. The German scheme 
falls behind the Belgian and the British ones, due to its smaller impact on the poverty depth 
figures. Germany has established effective policies for large families, but lags in terms of the 
protection of lone parents. The Swedish programme of child benefits plays a smaller role in 
reducing poverty and has almost no impact on poverty gap measures. As far as Russia is 
concerned, the programme of cash transfers for children does not appear to have any 
statistically significant impact on national inequality and poverty measures, as well as 
measures for children under 18 years. The groups which gain from this programme are large 
families (whose poverty gap drops by 11.1%) and lone parents (whose poverty headcount 
drops by 10.8%).   
The fact that Sweden does not come out as the best approach to alleviate child poverty, 
despite having the lowest national and child poverty headcounts before cash allowances for 
children are applied, might firstly appear counterintuitive. However, it should be emphasized 
that cases for cross-country policy swaps were selected not based on an outcome, but on the 
varying design of cash transfers for children. The actual child poverty outcomes are the result 
of an interaction of several factors, including the distribution of earnings, the demographic 
composition of the population and public policies. The latter, in their turn, are comprised of 
many interlinked elements, cash child allowances being just one of them. This paper does not 
aim to explain poverty rates in various countries, instead it attempts to find the most efficient 
policy design for child allowances in Russia controlling for other factors, including other tax-
benefit policies in place.  
 
4.2 Policy swaps 
In this section microsimulation models are applied in order to find the most efficient policy 
design of cash allowances for children in Russia, i.e. the one that achieves the best 
distributional outcomes under the fixed budget. The results of the budget-neutral policy 
‘borrowing’ (Reform 2.1) which implies no increase in total costs compared to the baseline 
Russian settings is shown in Table 5. However, the implementation of this reform implies 
enlarging the programme coverage. Firstly, the Russian child benefit is means-tested, while 
all the EU countries under study have established quasi-universal programmes which may or 
may not be additionally topped up by means-tested payments. In addition, in Germany and 
Belgium, the age threshold for qualifying as a dependent child is substantially higher than in 
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Russia. These higher age thresholds result in a 1.8-1.9 times increase in the number of 
beneficiaries under the Swedish and British scenarios and a 2.2 times increase under the 
German and Belgian scenarios. Given the fixed budget, the average per capita expenditures 
per child-beneficiary decrease in proportion to the increased expenditures on the extra 
beneficiaries. The vertical efficiency of the policy drops from 38.6% for the baseline Russian 
scheme to 21-22% for the schemes adopted from Sweden, Germany and Belgium, and to 
27.8% for the British scheme.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
As demonstrated by Table 5, given the small budget of child allowances in Russia, any 
changes in the programme design to incorporate rules of programmes of EU countries would 
not be advisable, because they either would not have any statistically significant impact on 
inequality and poverty outcomes or would even reduce the programme’s impact (as in case of 
the income gap of large families). 
Table 6 shows the results of implementation of the designs of child allowances employed in 
the EU countries in Russia, assuming a full-scale budget increase (Reform 2.2). The final 
budget is fixed at the level of 1.23% of the Russian GDP. This figure was computed as the 
average spending on child benefits in relation to GDP in the four European countries included 
in our study. Thus the original budget of child allowances in Russia is multiplied by 10. 
Compared to the baseline implementation (Table 4) this kind of simulation is more suitable 
for comparing the efficiency of various programme designs, given that the budget for all 
schemes is fixed at the same level. Due to the varying age thresholds for children in each 
system, the resulting increase in the mean expenditures per beneficiary compared to the 
baseline Russian settings, ranged from 4.4-4.6 times under the Belgian and German schemes, 
to 5.5 times under the British scheme, and to 5.7 times under the Swedish scheme. By 
definition all monetary parameters of the programme, including monetary thresholds for 
income tests, are multiplied by the same factor. Compared to the budget-neutral swap 
(Reform 2.1), the percentage of the budget going to the poor (i.e. vertical efficiency) has 
increased from 21-22% to 23-24% under the Swedish, German and Belgian schemes, and 
from 28 to 33% under the British scheme.  
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Table 5 about here 
 
Under the ten-fold budget increase, the programme of child benefits inevitably achieves 
much better outcomes for Russian children, but there are still four potential designs to choose 
from. It appears that, despite quite different policy designs, the Swedish, German and 
Belgium schemes, applied in Russia, achieve quite similar results as far as inequality and 
poverty outcomes are concerned. There are no statistically significant reductions in the Gini 
index and in the national poverty rate, but there is a 6-8% reduction in the national poverty 
gap. Compared to this, the British design is almost 1.5 times more effective in terms of 
reducing the income gap ratio. In terms of the poverty headcount for children under 18 years, 
the Swedish and Belgian schemes come close, providing a 20% reduction in the poverty 
headcount and a 13-15% reduction in the income gap, compared to the baseline simulation.  
But they are outperformed by the British scheme, which provides an almost 30% reduction 
for both poverty indicators.  As far as families with 3+ children are concerned, the Swedish 
and British designs reduce poverty incidence by over one third, but again the British system 
achieves a greater reduction (37.6%) in the poverty gap. For another vulnerable group – lone 
parents – the British system clearly outperforms the other three on both poverty indicators.  
In addition to the Reform 2.2 an opposite reform has been carried out (results are not shown 
here, but available from the author on request). In that reform the design of the Russian 
programme of child allowances was applied to the European countries, while budget of the 
Russian scheme was inflated up to the level characteristic for each of these countries. With 
the adoption of the Russian scheme, the number of potential beneficiaries was reduced by 
approximately one third in Sweden and Germany, by 20% in Belgium and by 10% in the UK. 
Consequently, the mean expenditures per child-beneficiary were increased by those factors. 
The Russian design helped to increase the progressivity of spending on child benefits in all 
continental European countries included in the study. A statistically significant reduction in 
the poverty headcount for all the groups of interest was achieved in Sweden, Germany and 
(although to a lesser extent) Belgium, although without major reductions in the income gap. 
In contrast, swapping the Russian child benefit scheme to the UK has had a higher impact on 
poverty depth measures. Simultaneously, due to the design of Russian programme, this 
reform worsened the position of couples with 1 and 2 children, both in terms of poverty 
incidence and, especially, the depth of poverty.  
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5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This study is the first attempt to apply the microsimulation method to an assessment of the 
distributional impact of cash transfers for children in Russia, within a European comparative 
setting. To accomplish this task, this study has applied RUSMOD and EUROMOD – the tax-
benefit microsimulation models for Russia and the EU. These microsimulation models were 
applied to estimate the counterfactual outcomes (that is, outcomes for participants had they 
not been exposed to the programme and had they been exposed to a different programme). 
Though a number of limitations is associated with using such models, the main advantage is 
their compatibility and comprehensive structure in handling and quantifying the effects of 
cross-national policy transfers.   
This paper argues that Russian policy makers can learn from international experiences, in 
order to improve the well-being of Russian children. The policy systems differ across Russia 
and the four European countries selected for the analysis, in terms of the volume of spending 
and the design of their non-contributory cash transfers to children. The literature points to the 
level of spending and the design of programmes as the two main determinants of child 
poverty. This study confirms that for Russia the size of the budget is more important than the 
the design of child allowances. Yet, conversely, at the high level of spending which is 
characteristic for European welfare states, the design effect can be more important. In other 
words, the comparative effects of spending level and of design are highly dependent on the 
national policy context (socio-demographic circumstances, labour market conditions, and 
‘pre-social policy’ interventions). For example, the Belgian scheme of child allowances 
outperforms the German and the British schemes in terms of all poverty depth indicators 
because it is better fit to tackle poverty of the vulnerable groups, despite the lower level of 
spending in Belgium.   
Controlling for the programme budget, the best child well-being outcomes were not achieved 
by means of expanding the coverage (as in Germany) and by ‘purely’ universal transfers (as 
in Sweden). A policy mix comprising both universal and means-tested benefits (as in the UK 
and Belgium) appears to be much more efficient in terms of child poverty reduction. The 
means-tested elements are necessary for alleviating the poverty depth of those groups that are 
detached from the labour market, and concentrated at the bottom of income distribution. This 
confirms the main conclusion made in the literature regarding the trade-off between 
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universalism and targeting. In most successful countries, welfare provision is mostly 
universalistic, while targeting is treated as an instrument for making universalism more 
effective. In other words, within the universal policy design there are some extra benefits for 
low-income groups, providing the ‘fine-tuning’ of the fundamentally universalist policies 
(Skocpol, 1991)  
The major problem with the Russian child benefit scheme is the negligible budget, rather than 
the design itself. The Russian scheme does not appear to be less effective in terms of its 
impact on child poverty outcomes, when transferred to any of the four European countries in 
replacement of their current arrangements. The only really major design related problem is a 
neglect of couples with 2 children; these could benefit from more comprehensive treatment of 
their needs, especially as the promotion of second parity births has been declared one of the 
priorities of the national strategy of demographic development.  
It should be noted, that a number of limitations had to be introduced in this paper in order to 
facilitate comparative analysis and to maintain meaningful policy ‘swaps’. Firstly, the 
analysis in this paper has focused on non-contributory cash allowances for families with 
children, omitting the rest of the child related cash benefits and non-cash policies. The cross-
country analysis of policy effects may be biased, because of the varying role played by non-
cash income across the different welfare regimes. Secondly, the analysis is concentrated on 
improving the material well-being outcomes for children from poor families, rather than all 
children. The reform scenarios that have been found most effective, involve an increase in the 
targeting accuracy of child benefits, which implies reducing benefits for non-poor households 
with children and redirecting the released resources to the poor. 
As far as more general limitations are concerned, the practical implementation issues in 
introducing more targeting have been left out of the picture. The evidence from application of 
means-tested programs in OECD countries demonstrates that although they demand less 
resources than universal programs, they are characterized by a number of problems, e.g. 
produce errors of inclusion and exclusion, require high administrative expenditure, decrease 
incentives to work, etc. (Moffitt, 1983). The other consideration that should not be ignored is 
a trade-off between the degree of low-income targeting and the size of redistributive budgets 
(Pritchett, 2005). Targeting and budgets are not independent: the budgets tend to decrease 
while targeting increases, as the average voter is less inclined to support the programs from 
which they do not have any benefit (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). Finally, it is important to 
remind that the simulations results obtained from EUROMOD and RUSMOD capture only 
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the first-order consequences of various options of the reform of cash child allowances. 
Possibly, if they were able to take into account the behavioral response (e.g. possible changes 
in the take up of means-tested benefits after increasing the targeting accuracy and raising the 
child benefit amounts), the advantages of a choice in favor of more targeting would be less 
evident. These issues are left for future research.  
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Table 1: Comparison of various models of family policy in the selected countries 
  Sweden Germany Belgium  UK  
Russian 
Federation 
      
Spending on social benefits for families 
and children, % of GDP, 2010* 
3.1 3.2 2.2 1.9 1.8 
   including spending on cash benefits 1.5 2.2 1.8 1.3 0.6 
Family policy model pro-egalitarian pro-traditional pro-natalist 
non-
interventionist 
non-
interventionist 
with strong 
pro-natalist 
rhethoric 
Policy objectives 
promote gender 
equality 
preserve 
traditional 
family 
raise fertility 
rates 
maintain 
minimum 
intervention 
to families  
raise fertility 
rates 
Level of support: 
     
Support for working parents High medium medium low low 
Cash benefits Medium high high high low 
Child care services High low high low medium 
Universalism/selectivity Universal mostly universal  
universal and 
means-tested 
mostly 
means-tested 
mostly means-
tested 
Sources:  
Own analysis based on Gauthier (1996) 
23 
 
* for European countries - EUROSTAT data (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database), date of 
extraction: 25 Jan 2014; for Russia - own estimates based on the Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS) data about the number of 
recepients and average size of payments, the Social Insurance Fund data, the Pension Fund data, the data on implementation of the 
Consolidated Budget and regional laws on the budgets implementation.  
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Table 2: The underlying datasets used in EUROMOD and RUSMOD 
Country Sweden Germany Belgium  United Kingdom  
Russian 
Federation 
Policy year 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Source database(s) EU-SILC  EU-SILC EU-SILC 
Family Resources 
Survey 
RLMS-HSE 
Period of data collection 
January-
December 2008 
April-August 
2008 
July-December 
2008 
April 2008 - 
March 2009 
October-
December 2010 
Income reference period
10
 2007 2007 2007 2008-2009 2010 
N of households 7,491 13,312 6,300 25,088 6,324 
N of individuals  18,663 28,904 15,108 57,276 16,918 
Source: EUROMOD country reports, see: https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/resources-for-euromod-users/country-
reports 
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Table 3: The design of child cash allowances/tax credits in the selected countries, 2010 
  Sweden Germany Belgium United Kingdom 
Russian 
Federation 
Names of benefits included in 
simulation: 
Child benefit 
(Barnbidrag) 
(bch_s) 
Child benefit 
(Kindergeld) 
(bch_s) and 
Additional child 
benefit 
(Kinderzuschlag) 
(bchot_s) 
Child Allowance 
(Kinderbijslag / 
Allocations 
familiales) 
(bch_s) 
Child Benefit 
(bch_s) Child Tax 
Credit (bfamt_s) 
Child allowance 
under 16(18) 
years 
(Ежемесячное 
пособие на 
ребенка) (bch_s) 
Design Centralised Centralised Centralised Centralised Decentralised 
Type of allowance 
Only universal 
allowance  
Universal 
allowance + 
income-tested 
allowance 
Universal 
allowance + 
income-tested 
allowance 
Universal 
allowance + 
income-tested tax 
credit 
Only income-
tested allowance 
Benefit unit  Nuclear family Nuclear family Nuclear family Nuclear family Nuclear family 
Child age threshold 
16 years (18 if in 
secondary school) 
18 years (25 if in 
full-time 
education and 
does not earn 
more than a 
specified amount) 
18 years (25 if in 
full-time 
education, not 
married and does 
not earn more 
than a specified 
amount 
16 years (19 if in 
school) 
16 years (18 if in 
full-time 
education) 
Benefit amounts:       
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By the number of children in 
family 
decrease with 
each additional 
child 
increase starting 
with the 4
th
 child 
increase with 
each additional 
child until the 4th 
one 
decrease with 
each additional 
child 
increase starting 
from the 3d child 
in several regions 
By the age of the child increase with age no increase with age 
increase for 
children under 1 
year 
increase in several 
regions 
By the type of family No no 
supplement for 
lone parents 
supplement for 
lone parents 
supplement for 
lone parents 
Source: EUROMOD and RUSMOD policy rules 
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Table 4: Policy characteristics and distributional impact of cash child allowances, Baseline versus Reform 1  
Country Sweden  Germany  Belgium 
United 
Kingdom 
Russian 
Federation   
Name of scenario: baseline baseline baseline baseline baseline 
Policy characteristics:   
 
      
Beneficiaries, % of population 22.9% 21.7% 25.9% 21.1% 10.4% 
Mean expenditure per beneficiary, euros 119.6 183.2 156.5 202.5 9.7 
Expenditure, % of GDP 0.71% 1.29% 1.20% 1.50% 0.12% 
Vertical efficiency, % of the budget spent on 
the poor 
23.3% 29.8% 29.6% 57.2% 38.6% 
Baseline policy indicator and % change in the indicator due to the reform:        
Name of scenario: reform 1 reform 1 reform 1 reform 1 reform 1 
Gini coefficient 0.237 0.273 0.232 0.331 0.409 
% change -4.5% -5.5% -9.2% -8.7% -0.5% 
Poverty headcount, all population 10.7% 12.7% 11.3% 16.9% 16.3% 
% change -14.9% -17.7% -24.5% -29.8% -2.2% 
Income gap ratio, all population 26.0% 18.1% 21.2% 27.6% 27.1% 
% change -0.1% -7.1% -25.6% -28.3% -2.2% 
Poverty headcount, children under 18 years 15.0% 16.9% 15.8% 25.6% 19.8% 
% change -34.8% -58.1% -55.4% -55.8% -5.3% 
Income gap ratio, children under 18 years 26.2% 15.2% 18.5% 26.8% 28.3% 
% change -0.3% -28.8% -49.6% -44.7% -4.8% 
Poverty headcount, couples with 1 child 7.6% 17.8% 8.6% 12.6% 15.7% 
% change -2.5% -13.6% -11.4% -37.7% -2.5% 
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Income gap ratio, couples with 1 child 30.3% 17.8% 23.3% 27.5% 27.3% 
% change -3.8% -10.8% -15.1% -15.3% 0.2% 
Poverty headcount, couples with 2 children 6.9% 11.2% 11.2% 17.9% 19.7% 
% change -28.9% -65.0% -33.3% -51.9% -1.0% 
Income gap ratio, couples with 2 children 24.3% 15.4% 19.6% 25.1% 30.7% 
% change 3.1% -13.6% -29.2% -33.8% -3.4% 
Poverty headcount, couples with 3+ children 18.3% 21.9% 15.4% 38.3% 34.0% 
% change -49.6% -99.5% -82.1% -46.1% -7.2% 
Income gap ratio, couples with 3+ children 26.5% 14.4% 15.9% 26.4% 32.2% 
% change -1.0% -50.4% -66.7% -54.2% -11.1% 
Poverty headcount, lone parents 31.0% 32.0% 32.8% 35.1% 21.2% 
% change -29.9% -33.2% -54.4% -70.4% -10.8% 
Income gap ratio, lone parents 24.3% 15.4% 18.5% 27.8% 25.5% 
% change -1.0% -20.8% -51.2% -43.5% -3.6% 
Notes:  
Statistically significant changes (at the 95% significance level) are highlighted in grey 
Poverty headcount = the number of people with incomes below poverty line, % of the population; Povery gap = the average shortfall in 
income of the poor from the poverty line, % of poverty line 
Reform 1 = policies are ‘removed’ from the tax-benefit systems 
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD and RUSMOD 
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Table 5: Policy characteristics and distributional impact of child allowances, Reform 2.1 versus Baseline  
 
Country 
Russian 
Federation  
Sweden Germany Belgium 
United 
Kingdom 
Name of scenario baseline reform 2.1 reform 2.1 reform 2.1 reform 2.1 
Policy characteristics:           
Beneficiaries, % of population 10.4% 18.3% 22.6% 23.7% 18.8% 
Mean expenditure per beneficiary, euros 9.7 5.5 4.4 4.2 5.3 
Expenditure, % of GDP 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 
Vertical efficiency, % of the budget spent on 
the poor 
38.6% 21.8% 21.2% 21.9% 27.8% 
Baseline policy indicator and % change in the indicator due to the reform:        
Gini coefficient 0.409 0.410 0.410 0.410 0.410 
% change   0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 
Poverty headcount, all population 16.3% 16.5% 16.5% 16.4% 16.4% 
% change   0.7% 1.2% 0.6% 0.3% 
Income gap ratio, all population 27.1% 27.5% 27.4% 27.4% 27.3% 
% change   1.5% 1.2% 1.4% 1.1% 
Poverty headcount, children under 18 years 19.8% 20.1% 20.3% 20.1% 19.9% 
% change   1.7% 2.8% 1.8% 0.8% 
Income gap ratio, children under 18 years 28.3% 29.2% 29.2% 29.3% 29.1% 
% change   3.3% 3.4% 3.5% 3.1% 
Poverty headcount, couples with 1 child 15.7% 15.6% 15.8% 15.8% 15.7% 
% change   -0.5% 0.8% 1.3% 0.0% 
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Income gap ratio, couples with 1 child 27.3% 27.4% 27.1% 27.0% 27.0% 
% change   0.6% -0.6% -1.1% -0.8% 
Poverty headcount, couples with 2 children 19.7% 19.4% 19.7% 19.7% 19.7% 
% change   -1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Income gap ratio, couples with 2 children 30.7% 31.1% 31.0% 30.9% 30.7% 
% change   1.3% 1.0% 0.6% 0.0% 
Poverty headcount, couples with 3+ children 34.0% 34.7% 34.7% 32.9% 33.6% 
% change   2.1% 2.1% -3.4% -1.3% 
Income gap ratio, couple with 3+ children 32.2% 35.0% 35.9% 37.0% 35.9% 
% change   8.7% 11.4% 14.9% 11.4% 
Poverty headcount, lone parent families 21.2% 22.5% 22.8% 22.5% 21.8% 
% change   6.3% 7.7% 6.3% 3.1% 
Income gap ratio, lone parent families 25.5% 26.3% 26.2% 26.4% 26.3% 
% change   3.2% 2.7% 3.5% 3.0% 
Notes:  
Statistically significant changes (at the 95% significance level) are highlighted in grey 
Reform 2.1 = Child allowances from Sweden, Germany, Belgium and the UK are transferred to Russia, budget neutral swap 
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD and RUSMOD 
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i
 This paper used RUSMOD and EUROMOD version F6.0. RUSMOD has been constructed using the 
EUROMOD platform (version F5.37). EUROMOD is continually being improved and updated and the results 
presented here represent the best available at the time of writing. Any remaining errors, results produced, 
interpretations or views presented are the author’s responsibility. The process of extending and updating 
EUROMOD is financially supported by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
of the European Commission [Progress grant no. VS/2011/0445]. We make use of micro-data from the EU 
Statistics on Incomes and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) made available by Eurostat under contract 
EUSILC/2011/55 and contract EU-SILC/2011/32. The usual disclaimers apply. 
ii
 Originally the model was called ‘pro-family but non-interventionist’. This study refers to this model as the 
‘non-interventionist’ model, because it is unlikely to find an example of ‘anti-family’ family policy model. 
iii
 Whenever income reference dates are ‘older’ than the analyzed policies, the adjustment factors are used to 
update income levels to a respective policy year. For example, in the British model the policy rules of 2010 are 
applied to the population of 2009, but with income levels updated to 2010. For Sweden, Germany and Belgium 
the policy rules for 2010 are applied to the population of 2008 with the income reference period of the year 
2007. In Russia the policy year simulated and the income reference period are the same (2010), so updating was 
unnecessary. 
iv
 Currently, EUROMOD neither includes nor simulates in-kind benefits or public services. Due to the lack of 
data on contribution histories, the insurance-based cash allowances (such as unemployment benefits, 
maternity/parental allowances) cannot be simulated everywhere. Education related allowances were simulated 
for Germany only; in the rest of the countries they depend on a number of conditions that are unknown (such as 
parental income or the achieving of learning objectives by the student, etc.) Housing benefits exist in all 
countries under study, but they could not be simulated in Germany and Belgium. 
v
 Social assistance programmes in Russia and Sweden have specific elements related to the presence of children, 
while in Germany, Belgium and the UK they depend on the means test alone. Childcare subsidies are not 
available in all the countries, because of the different level and quality of supply of in-kind services. Finally, in 
contrast to tax credits, that are basically cash benefits provided through the tax system, tax allowances and 
deductions are problematic to replicate in another country, because they are embedded into national tax systems 
which differ considerably across the five countries under study. The major difference is that Russia has a flat 
income tax rate, while all European countries apply (although to a different degree) a progressive tax schedule. 
vi
 To replicate this instrument in other countries the average amounts per child were computed, by dividing the 
total costs of the programme for each category of recipients (e.g. two-parent families, lone parent families, large 
families, etc.) by the total number of recipients in the category.       
vii
 It is noteworthy, since 2013 changes were introduced to child benefit in the UK: child benefit which was not 
taxable until 2013 is now effectively taxed for parents who pay income tax at the 40% (or higher) marginal rate 
(annual income over £50,000). In addition, from 2013 child benefit is subject to the benefit cap, which applies 
when weekly entitlement to certain specified benefits exceeds a threshold of £500 a week for couples and lone 
parents or £350 a week for singles. 
viii
 The results thereinafter show the net effects of reforms of child allowances, i.e. the effects after the 
interactions of child allowances with the rest of the tax-benefit system. It is worthy to note, that in contrast to 
Russia, in European countries child allowances are typically not included in the means test for other social 
benefits and are not taxable, hence there are fewer interactions.   
ix
 The structure of household consumer expenditures in Russia differs from that in a mature market economy. 
The share of spending on rent and utilities is substantially lower, while the share of spending on food is higher, 
resulting in lower economies of scale. A scientifically derived equivalence scale for Russia based on a nationally 
representative survey of household expenditure for mid-2000s had an elasticity coefficient e=0.78, which is 
close to an old OECD equivalence scale (e=0.73). The application of the modified OECD scale (e=0.53) has had 
the effect of eliminating any differences between child and overall poverty rates, making the situation with 
regards to  child poverty look quite unproblematic in all countries under study except the UK. Given that the 
main focus of this research is child well-being, in this study we opted for using an old OECD scale.  
10
 It is important to note that in the Russian and the UK data the income reference period is the previous month, 
whereas in the other countries annual income is used. At the same time, the income for means-tests is measured 
over the different period (for example, in Russia it is either 3 or 6 months). Due to differences in the income 
reference periods, the eligibility for means-tested benefits could be both over- and under-estimated during the 
cross-country policy ‘swaps’.   
 
